Abstract: This paper addresses the detection and isolation of replay attacks on sensor measurements. As opposed to previously proposed additive watermarking, we propose a multiplicative watermarking scheme, where each sensor's output is separately watermarked by being fed to a SISO watermark generator. Additionally, a set of equalizing filters is placed at the controller's side, which reconstructs the original output signals from the received watermarked data. We show that the proposed scheme has several advantages over existing approaches: it has no detrimental effects on the closed-loop performance in the absence of attacks; it can be designed in a modular fashion, independently of the design of the controller and anomaly detector; it facilitates the detection of replay attacks and the isolation of the time at which the replayed data was recorded. These properties are discussed in detail and the results are illustrated through a numerical example.
INTRODUCTION
Modern control systems are increasingly relying on information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures to exchange measurement and control signals. However, the increasing use of pervasive and open-standard ICT systems results in control systems becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious cyberthreats, which may affect the physical processes through the control loop.
The topic of cyber-secure control systems has been receiving increasing attention recently. An overview of existing cyberthreats and vulnerabilities in networked control systems is presented in Cárdenas et al. (2008) ; Teixeira et al. (2015) . Detectability conditions of stealthy false-data injection attacks to control systems are closely examined in Teixeira et al. (2012) , where the authors characterized modifications to the system dynamics that reveal stealthy attacks. Recently, Miao et al. (2014) proposed an static output coding scheme combining the outputs of multiple sensors to reveal stealthy data injection attacks on sensors.
Less studied are attacks of multiplicative nature, such as replay (Mo et al., 2015) and routing attacks (Ferrari and Teixeira, 2017) . Within this class of attacks, replay attacks have been more extensively analyzed. In Mo et al. (2015) , the analysis of detectability conditions for replay attacks shows that, asymptotically, replay attacks are undetectable. To detect replay attacks, the authors proposed a detection scheme through additive watermarking, where noise is purposely injected in the system by the actuators to watermark the sensor outputs through known correlations. However, such additive watermark presents some drawbacks: the performance of the system decreases and the actuators are further burdened with noisy inputs. These two drawbacks can be tackled by employing multiplicative sensor watermarks, akin to the techniques explored in Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Miao et al. (2014) .
As main contributions of this paper, we study the fundamental limitations in detectability of replay attacks and propose tailored detection and isolation schemes to identify these attacks. In particular, to facilitate their detection and identification, we propose a multiplicative sensor watermarking scheme akin to that in Ferrari and Teixeira (2017) , where each sensor output is separately watermarked by being fed to a SISO filter with timevarying piecewise constant parameters. Additionally, an equalization filter is incorporated at the controller's side to reconstruct the original plant outputs and ensure the modularity of the scheme, without the need to redesign the controller, and with no detrimental effects on the closedloop performance.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the problem formulation, describe and analyze the detectability of replay attacks without watermarking, and summarize the main elements of the proposed watermarking scheme. The sensor watermarking scheme is described in detail Section 3, where the performance in the absence of attacks and the detectability of replay attacks with the proposed scheme are also analyzed. To detect replay attacks, an observer-based detection scheme with robust adaptive threshold is proposed in Section 4. Numerical results are presented in Section 5, and the paper concludes with final remarks in Section 6.
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PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the control system and describe the main problem at hand. Consider the modeling framework described in Teixeira et al. (2015) , where the control system is composed by a physical plant (P), a feedback controller (C), and an anomaly detector (R), which are modeled in a discrete-time state-space form as P :
R :
where 
, the controller and detector dynamics can be written as
where A cr , B cr , C cr , D cr , C u , and D u are derived from (1).
The main focus of this paper is to investigate the detection and isolation of cyber replay attacks. This attack scenario, as well a fundamental limitation in their detectability akin to the results of Mo et al. (2015) , are described next.
Replay attack scenario
The replay attack scenario considered in this work is summarized in Figure 1 . In this scenario, the adversary first records the measurement signals transmitted by all the sensors starting at time Fig. 1 . A block-diagram representation of the setting considered in the present paper, with novel contributions shaded in color.
Detectability of replay attacks
To analyze the detectability of replay attacks, consider the residual signal at the time in which the measurements were recorded, y r , which is described by
As an inherent limitation in detectability of replay attacks by LTI detectors, the following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for which, under attack, the residual signal y r converges to y r . 
The remainder of the proof directly follows from the PBH observability test (Zhou et al., 1996) .
If there were no anomalies when y p [k] was recorded, an evaluation of y r either does not trigger any alarm, or it triggers a false alarm in which no anomaly is present. Therefore, to relate Th. 1 to the undetectability of replay attacks on LTI systems, we make the following assumption. Assumption 2. The residual y r does not trigger any alarm.
Watermarking and equalization scheme
To allow the presence of replay attacks to be detected, we propose to turn the closed-loop system (1) into a switched system parametrized by a controlled variable In the proposed scheme, we thus introduce a preprocessing step, which we denote as sensor watermarking, Proceedings of the 20th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-14, 2017 where each sensor processes the measurements through a filter parametrized by θ before transmitting the data. Denoting W(θ) as the set of watermarking filters, the watermarked sensor outputs to be transmitted, denoted as y pw [k] , are described by
As argued earlier, due the the presence of cyber-attacks and other anomalies, the watermarked data transmitted by the sensors (y pw [k] ) may differ from the data received at the controller's side (ỹ pw [k] ). The controller and anomaly detector also apply a pre-processing step, denoted as equalization, where the received watermarked dataỹ pw [k] is processed through an equalizing filter parametrized by θ [k] . The objective of the equalization step is to remove the watermark from the received data,ỹ pw [k] , thus producing the reconstructed plant outputs y pq [k] . As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the reconstructed measurements y pq [k] are fed to the anomaly detector and controller.
Denoting Q(θ) as the equalizer, the residual and control input are computed from the received dataỹ pw [k] as
Furthermore, the parameter θ[k] is changed frequently as to limit the time in which a replay attack may remain undetected, as explained in Sect. 3 and 4. Under a replay attack, the replayed watermarked data is described by
where the watermarking filter at attack recording time was
To illustrate the reasoning behind the proposed scheme, in the following we describe the scheme in the frequency domain. Denote the nominal transfer function of the residual, without the additional pre-processing filter, as y r (z) = F cr (z)y p (z). Let W (z; θ) and Q(z; θ) be the transfer function of the pre-processing filters at the sensors and anomaly detector, respectively, which are parametrized by θ. Furthermore, suppose the filters are designed such that Q(z; θ)W (z; θ ) = I + D(z; θ, θ ) where, ideally, D(z; θ, θ) = 0 and D(z; θ, θ ) is 'large' for θ = θ . The transfer function of the anomaly detector is given by y r (z) = F cr (z)Q(z; θ)ỹ pw (z), whereas the pre-processed measurements are given by y pw (z) = W (z; θ)y p (z). Under nominal conditions, i.e.ỹ pw = y pw , the residual is then given by y r (z) = F cr (z)y p (z) + F cr (z)D(z; θ, θ)y p (z). On the contrary, under a replay attack whereỹ pw (z) = y pw (z) = W (z; θ )y p (z), we have
Note that, since the filters W (z; θ) and Q(z; θ) are designed to ensure D(z; θ, θ) = 0, the transfer function of the residual (and also the control signal) in the absence of attacks is decoupled from the pre-processing filters. Hence, the anomaly detector and controller can be designed in a modular fashion, independently from the pre-processing filters. To detect replay attacks, a robust threshold is designed so that, in the absence of attacks, the residual evaluation is robust to the unknown disturbances η and ξ. As the term F cr (z)D(z; θ, θ)y p (z) is 0 by design, the modularity also extends itself to the threshold design, which needs not to consider the pre-processing filters.
On the other hand, when a replay attack occurs, the residual will be driven by F cr (z)D(z; θ, θ )y p (z), which is large by design and, therefore, easily detectable.
SENSOR WATERMARKING
Let the watermark generator at each sensor be implemented through an infinite impulse response (IIR) filter of order N . For the ith measurement, the watermark generator is described by the difference equation Regarding the equalizing filters at the detector's side, their aim is to compute y pq [k] , which is a reconstruction of the signals y p [k] given the received watermarked measurementsỹ pw [k] . A simple approach would be to consider the equalizing filter of the ith measurement as the inverse of the respective watermark filter, namely
For notation simplicity and without loss of generality, we suppose that there is only one sensor, i.e., n y = 1, and therefore omit the superscript in the parameters and use the notation w A = w In relation to the replay attack detection scheme proposed in the previous section, each admissible value of the piecewise constant variable θ[k] is denoted as a particular choice of filter parameters, e.g., θ j = {w A,j , w B,j }.
The watermarking filter dynamics (7) can be written as W(θ) in (4), by using the controllable canonical form, where x w [k] ∈ R N and the matrices are given by Similarly, by using the controllable canonical form and the coordinate transformation matrix T = w B,(0) I, the equalizer dynamics (8) can be written as Q(θ) in (5), where
N and the matrices are given by D q (θ) = 1 w B, (0) , Proceedings of the 20th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-14, 2017 (0) . . . , for n = 1, . . . , N.
In the remainder of the paper, we follow the aforementioned scheme and design the filters so that they are stable. Assumption 3. The watermarking filter W(θ) and its inverse Q(θ) are stable for all θ ∈ Θ. 2
Note that the latter assumption holds when the watermark generator W is designed as a FIR filter of order N (with N poles at the origin) that has exactly N zeros, all inside the unit circle, which in turn leads to the following assumption. Next, considering the closed-loop system with the proposed watermarking and equalizing filters, we discuss the closed-loop performance in the absence of attacks, followed by an analysis of the detectability of replay attacks. The core element of both discussions is the cascade of the watermarking filter W(θ 2 ) and equalizing filter Q(θ 1 ), which we denote as QW(θ 1 , θ 2 ). By defining x qw x w , x q , the cascade system QW(θ 1 , θ 2 ) is described by
where
,
Performance in the absence of replay attacks
Although the main aim of the proposed scheme is to detect replay attacks, it is important that it does not decrease the nominal performance in the absence of attacks. To analyze the impact of the watermarking scheme in the absence of attacks, we compare the nominal system (1) and the watermarked system without attacks described by (4) and (5), where W(θ) and Q(θ) are matched w.r.t. θ. As a first step, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. Consider the pair of filters W(θ) and Q(θ), where Q(θ) is the stable inverse of the FIR filter W(θ).
The output of the cascade QW(θ, θ) is given by
Furthermore,
Proof. The proof follows from (9) for w A,1 = w A,2 = 0 and w B,1 = w B,2 = w B . Using the transformationx qw = T x qw such thatx qw = x w (x w − x q ) , we obtain
Next, we analyze the performance of the closed-loop system with the proposed scheme in the absence of attacks. Theorem 2. Consider the closed-loop system with watermarked sensors described by (4) and (5). Furthermore, suppose that θ[k] is updated at times k ∈ K θ . In the absence of replay attacks (i.e.,ỹ pw = y pw andỹ p = y p ), the performance of the closed-loop system with the matched filters Q(θ) and W(θ) is the same as the performance of the nominal closed-loop system (1) if, and only if, the states of Q(θ) and W(θ) are such that
which implies that (1) and the closed-loop system described by (4) and (5) have identical state trajectories. Remark 1. By imposing that, at switching times, the watermarking and equalizing filters set their states to 0, our proposed scheme does not reduce the performance of the nominal system in the absence of attacks, thus ensuring the modularity of the scheme by decoupling the design of the controller and detector from that of the filters, as opposed to the scheme proposed in Mo et al. (2015) .
Detectability of replay attacks with sensor watermarking
As the main step to analyze the detectability of replay attacks under the proposed watermarking scheme, we derive the following result. Lemma 2. Consider the pair of filters W(θ 2 ) and Q(θ 1 ), where Q(θ 1 ) is the stable inverse of the FIR filter W(θ 1 ). For θ 1 = θ 2 , the cascade QW(θ 1 , θ 2 ) has a minimal realization of order N , which has the same poles as Q(θ 1 ).
Lemma 2 implies that the cascade system QW(θ 1 , θ 2 ) has a non-trivial transfer function (i.e., different from 1) for θ 1 = θ 2 . Furthermore, the cascade QW(θ 1 , θ 2 ) can be written as 
During the replay attack, the residual output y r is driven by the replayed data y p as described by
Proof. The proof follows directly from (6) and (5).
We now present the main result of this section regarding the detectability of replay attacks under the proposed watermarking scheme.
Proceedings of the 20th IFAC World Congress Toulouse, France, July 9-14, 2017 Theorem 3. Consider a replay attack that has recorded data from time Th. 3 indicates that, when θ = θ , the undetectability of the replay attack is not guaranteed a priori, since it depends on the exogenous input y p . Next, we design an anomaly detector and a robust threshold to evaluate the residual and detect replay attacks.
DETECTION AND ISOLATION OF REPLAY ATTACKS
We now leverage the proposed watermarking scheme to first detect replay attacks by means of an observer and a robust threshold, and then isolate the recording time of replayed data, by identifying its watermark parameter θ . Assumption 5. No replay attacks are present for 0 ≤ k < k 0 , with k 0 being the attack start time. Moreover, the variables x p , x pw and u remain bounded before the occurrence of an attack, i.e., there exist some stability
Detection of Replay Attacks
The detector R in (1) will be implemented as the following observer (Ferrari et al., 2008) , (1), and feeding it the reconstructed output y pq . In the absence of attacks and assuming the watermarking filter and equalizer are initialized according to Remark 1, the estimation errors x p −x p dynamics follows from (1), (10) and (12) [
leading to the following solution for the output residual
For attack detection, the following threshold shall be used
where α i and δ i are two constants such that ,(i) being the i-th row of matrix C p (see (Ferrari et al., 2008) and (Dowler, 2013, Th. 3.5) 
the difference between delayed and actual input, then the attack will be detected at the time instant k d .
Proof. During a replay attack, Q, R and C are disconnected from P, and instead are fed y p [k] . By redefining as x p −x p and remembering Lemma 3, the solution for y r can be computed by subtracting (12) from (6):
The proof follows from Ferrari et al. (2008, Th. 3 .1).
Isolation and Identification of Replay Attacks
Only after a successful detection, a bank of |Θ| = M filters is activated in order to isolate the replay attack, and to identify the replayed data parameter θ which provides information as to when the data was recorded.
Each filter j is parametrized by θ j ∈ Θ and designed as
The isolation and identification logic relies on Th. 3: only for the filter j with θ j = θ , y r,j [k] will converge
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Riccardo M.G. Ferrari et al. / IFAC PapersOnLine 50-1 (2017) r,j,(i) whereȳ r,(i) [k] is the threshold in (13). Furthermore, the time at which the data was recorded, k r , can be isolated as belonging to the time-interval [k j , k j+1 ), where we recall that k j ∈ K θ is such that θ[k] = θ j for k j ≤ k < k j+1 .
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
As a numerical example, we consider P to be an unstable discrete time LTI system with n p = 2, n u = 1, n y = 2 The attack effects on the estimated plant outputŷ p and the true one y p are visible in Fig. 2 : due to the attack bringing the plant in open loop, y p quickly diverges, with only a minor deviation onŷ p . Finally, the analysis of the residual y r and its thresholdȳ r (Fig. 3) shows that the attack is detected and isolated right after k 3 T s = 225 s, when new watermark parameters are generated.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proposed a multiplicative sensor watermarking scheme, where each output is separately fed to Fig. 3 . First components of detection and isolation the residuals and thresholds. Between 210 and 225s no detection is possible as watermark parameters are still holding the value they had during attack recording. a SISO watermark generator. As opposed to previous additive watermarking schemes, no additional burden is put on actuators and the closed-loop performance is preserved, thanks to the inclusion of a watermark removing functionality. Analytical results, including attack detectability conditions for the proposed scheme, were derived. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach was illustrated through a numerical study, where a replay attack was detected and identified even during steady-state. Future works will be directed on studying the resilience of the watermarking scheme itself, and on developing nonlinear watermark generators.
